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In the first article of this series we have introduced the debates on the ontology 
of power and the ways in which these debates have influenced the theoretical 
divisions in International Relations (IR). In this second article we will present 
the main epistemological approaches of the different paradigms, leading to 
controversies on the mechanisms involved in the activation of power and its 
dimensions. 
Mechanisms of Power: different theoretical approaches 
Our first step is to address the questions “how power is activated” and 
“how powerproceeds once it is activated”. Scholars of diverse backgrounds 
proposed different approaches to answer those questions, leading us to the 
possibility of dealing with the controversies around the epistemology of power. 
According to the realist tradition, as explained previously, the regular way by 
which actors operate to assert control over the others and the system is coercion. 
Through the manipulation of material resources (either 
via sanctions or inducements), an actor could generate changes in the other’s 
actor conduct even in contrary of their interests. As main representatives of the 
neo-realist paradigm, Waltz and Mearsheimer went one step forward when they 
affirmed that the distribution of military capabilities constitutes the best 
measurable expression of power1; and consequently, that the display of 
alterations in capabilities is what explains the main changes in decision-making. 
However, most of the neo-realists tend to accept another way to activate power 
that is based on the concept of socialization. Although renowned for being 
“mentioned” by Waltz himself, the concept is in fact developed by other scholars, 
among them Ikenberry and Kupchan, who move large away from Waltz. They 
explain the mechanisms and conditions of socialization using the neorealist 
scheme but, unlike Waltz, Ikenberry and Kupchan incorporate the “normative” 
element as “a different aspect of power” which guides the state’s behavior.2 
Moreover, they assume a pseudo-liberal perspective on the role of specific 
agents (elites) in providing systemic change, undermining the unitary actor 
assumption and thus abandoning the structuralist approach that neo-realists 
have usually adopted. 
Ikenberry and Kupchan seek to describe how hegemonic powers have a 
tendency to activate processes of socialization, through which secondary 
countries internalize the norms of the hegemon. According to them, 
socialization occurs primarily when countries suffer the fragmentation of 
internal coalitions (especially after wars and political crisis), stimulating certain 
elites to embrace the norms that the hegemon is articulating. If the receptivity 
and realignment of the elites is linked with coercive power, norms could be 
consolidated as well as the policies in line with them (albeit this order may vary 
depending on whether the socialization is carried through normative 
persuasion, external inducement or internal reconstruction).3 It is important to 
note that this is a “one-player” argument; the authors say little about “real” cases 
- where there are many candidates to hegemony and the socialization 
processes are “in competition”. This appears as a very interesting research 
agenda for the future. 
The eighties and nineties developed other interesting realist approaches who 
explore ideational elements in power analysis. One of them is the Krasner’s 
approach oninstitutional power, which consists of a “metapower” that has 
indirect control over outcomes by changing the setting of the confrontation.4 
Baldwin went also in that direction by embedding what he called the paradox of 
unrealized power, in which the will of using the power is a resource by itself.5 
Likewise, Walt´s theory about the balance of threat adds aggressive 
intentions as a main variable, what makes power not a function of material 
resources but of inter-subjective factors.6 The three went clearly beyond 
neorealist assumptions. 
Of course the incorporation of normative elements to analyze power 
relationships did not only emerge in the realist tradition, but also in the liberal 
one, the natural candidate. The most famous liberal twist came recently from 
Nye’s soft power concept.7 Acceptingcoercion” and inducement as two relevant 
forms of displaying power, Nye suggests co-opting as “a third dimension of 
power” which affects behavior without being commanded through threats or 
payments, but through attracting with indirect resources (such as values, 
culture and policies). This “soft“ version of power, argues the prestigious 
scholar, becomes crucial in a global information era in which “winning hearts 
and minds” matters more and more; an era in which hard sower and soft 
power are required to be connected (in what he calls smart power) in order to 
enable the legitimate use of power, as the war in Irak showed to the United 
States. 
Is not casual that Nye writes from a (North)American perspective in a period of 
time in which their legitimacy was so questioned; anyhow, his concept was 
rapidly attributed to other situations. Despite the popularity of Nye’s scheme, 
the theoretical contribution is still weak. As Guzzini argued years before, it is 
clear that “power alone is not what we are looking for”8- what is lacking is an 
approach that could address the causal mechanisms of the different types of 
power and could identify their devices once they are activated. 
Guzzini himself will provide an answer to that challenge, by recommending the 
separation of the two types of power structural power and interactionist 
power in two different concepts: governance and power.9 Citing economical-
rationalist terms, this new dyadic conceptualization examines the interactions 
between systemic rules (market constraints) and the decisions of the agents 
(strategic behaviors), in a power analysis. As a constructivist, Guzzini sustains 
that in this (inter-subjective) relationship of power, the actors change interests 
and identities, stressing the value of legitimate power (authority) in enabling “a 
widing realm of possible (in political action)”.10 Despite Guzzini paved the way 
to other constructivist approaches11, he still leaves us with the confusion 
between the two different stages of the argumentative chain: the first one based 
on the agent-structuredistinction, and the second one on the material-
ideal division. 
Barnett and Duvall would release us from that confusion by presenting 
their taxonomy of four dimensions of power.12 It combines the two variables 
presented above with different names; on one side, the expression of the 
power (actor’s interactions vs. structural constitution), and on the other side 
the specificity of the power relations (direct connection vs. diffuse relation).13 
The analytic combination leads us to four types in which power 
operates: compulsory, institutional, structural and productive. Therefore, while 
in a simultaneous power analysis, one side would explain what is “possible” 
(closer to the Compulsory corner), the other one would explain what is 
“legitimate-desirable” (closer to the Productive corner).14 
Once this has been approached, the next challenge consists of transferring these 
theoretical understanding to a methodological scheme for power analysis in IR. 
This will be addressed on the next and last part of the series. 
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